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.ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE
GEORGE L. PRIEST"
I strongly support the antitrust laws and believe that the
general principles established by our antitrust laws are of great
and abiding importance toward ordering a competitive
economy.
One of the most important developments of modern times is
globalization--the increase in international competitiveness. l
An increase in competitiveness--in competition--of course, is
the objective of antitrust law. Thus, we might think of the
increase in global competitiveness as an alternative to antitrust
enforcement. The more general the competition and the more
serious the global competition, the less we need to rely on
antitrust prosecution to maintain competitive conditions in
American markets. As a consequence, our antitrust policies
should focus, as Chairman Pitofsky mentioned,2 more on
securing and maintaining ease of entry into American markets
than on refining our economic analysis of the potential effects
of very specific industrial practices-and surely more than on
fine-tuning industrial structure.
Perhaps more importantly, in many modern contexts we must
think about antitrust enforcement in new and different ways. We
must adapt our interpretation of the antitrust laws to novel
industrial situations and to modern industries that operate
much differently from the industries that our antitrust laws have
regulated in the past. We must recognize that high tech
industries have a much different base and operate differently
than the manufacturing industries with which we have had the
predominant experience in antitrust enforcement over the last
one hundred years. Compare, for example, a prototypical
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manufacturing industry such as steel to a modern information-
based industry such as computer software. At its creation in the
early years of this century, V.S. Steel had a market share of
roughly ninety percent.3 Competition, as we would expect,
eroded that market share, but did so very slowly, at a rate of
roughly ten percent per decade.4 Therefore, fifty years later,
even V.S. Steel still remained by far the dominant firm in the
American steel industry. Quite in contrast, in the computer
software industry in the years since 1980, a period of less than
two decades, we have seen three separate instances of industrial
dominance--ffiM, Apple, and now Microsoft.5 Moreover, these
revolutions have been complete, not partial, as in the case of
V.S. Steel; that is, there remain very few people who still use
DOS or Macintosh exclusively. They are period pieces and of
little market significance in the modern software market.
Because market power in high tech industries stems from a
different source than market power in manufacturing, we must
address antitrust enforcement differently. Market power in
manufacturing derives from the physical possession of property:
from the possession of a dominant set of plants such as by V.S.
Steel, or from the possession of dominant natural resources
such as by Alcoa.6 These physical resources are not easily
duplicated so that it takes a substantial period of time--many
decades-to develop competitive alternatives. In contrast,
market power in high tech industries derives from information,
or more importantly, from the configuration of information
through a network.7 It is not simply that idea A is superior to
idea B, but that membership in network A provides a broader set
of advantages (for the moment) than membership in network B.
Computer software is appropriately viewed as a language. It is
not surprising that a language such as Windows commands a
very high market share. There are many benefits from mutual
communication in a language. The benefits of language do not
derive from the individual efficiency of anyone component of
3. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S.417, 459 (1920).
4. See Donald O. Parsons & EdwardJohn Ray, The United States Steel Consolidation: The
Creation ofMarket ContTO~ 18J.L. & ECON. 181 (1975).
5 See United States v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. IBM,
60 F.RD. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
6. See United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
7. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowen, Legal Implications ofNetwlll'k Econom,'c Effects,
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the language. Thus, we are not going to understand the sources
of the market share attending a language by asking, as we do in
other antitrust contexts, whether one component of that
language, such as Internet Explorer, is more efficient than or
superior to an alternative potential component, such as
Netscape's Navigator.
There is nothing surprising in this analysis. As a language,
English commands a very high market share here in the United
States and, increasingly, around the world. That dominant
market share is not the result, surely, of the individual efficiency
of any single component of the English language. That is, we
speak English not because English verbs or nouns are more
efficient in any sense than French or Spanish verbs or nouns.
We speak English because we belong to and wish to continue
membership in the English language network. Citizens of the
world are increasingly learning to communicate in English, not
because they admire England or the United States--in many
cases, the reverse---but because they, too, appreciate the mutual
value that comes from participation in the English language
network; a value, I might add, that has been significantly
enhanced by software innovations such as Windows.
The understanding of the implications of networks and the
mutual benefit ~at comes from participation in a network is
extremely important for the application of antitrust law to the
software and other intellectual property industries.8 Toward this
end, we must keep in mind the most central goal of antitrust law
which is to provide benefit to consumers. There has been very
distinguished economic testimony presented in the Microsoft
case9 (perhaps supported by Chairman Pitofsky) claiming that
the network effect of Windows constitutes a barrier to entry.lO I
believe that this is a fundamental misconception. The network
effect ofWindows, or of any other language, is an efficiency, not
a barrier. The simple question proving the point is to ask
whether consumers would be better or worse off if the network
to which they belong were broken up.
Chairman Pitofsky's notion that we have to weigh the benefits
of the efficiency of the network against the barrier to entry
8. See id. at 500.
9. See United States v. Microsoft, No. CIV. A. 98-1232, 1998 WL 614485, at *3 (D.D.C.
Sept. 14, 1998).
10. See Lemley & McGowen, supra note 7, at 501.
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effects cannot quite be right.II That is, the efficiency and the
barrier are the same thing. Take his very peculiar example in
which prices decline by five percent because of the efficiency of
the network, but rise fifty percent because of the barrier to
entry.12 The example is peculiar because it is not obvious why
anyone would want to become or remain a member of such a
network. A person or firm joins a network because the net
benefit-eost savings less price-is greater than some current
alternative. In the Pitofsky example, there is no net
benefit-there is a forty-five percent cost disadvantage--which is
not a barrier to entry but an encouragement to entry or to
substitution. In the example, there is a forty-five percent window
for alternative competition from another network (or even the
previous status quo) to reclaim the market. Put differently, the
firm that created the network has a forty-five percent cost
disadvantage to a competing network or to the status quo. That
is not appropriately viewed as a barrier to entry.
In contrast, the network effect that repels entry is the one in
which efficiency is so great that it cannot be easily duplicated.
Reverse the Pitofsky example. Imagine that costs decline fifty
percent because of the efficiency of the network but prices rise
five percent because of the superior competitive position of the
provider of the network. That forty-five percent advantage is
what poses difficulty to competitors. But it is not a barrier; it is
an advantage.
Again, we must ask the most basic question in antitrust. Are
consumers going to be better or worse off from breaking up or
impairing in some way the effects of the network? The call for
mandated licensing in various high-tech cases seems to me to
confuse this point. The movement to unbundle now-integrated
aspects of a language misses the point. Both proposed policies,
in essence, serve to break up the network and destroy the
efficiency. Consumers do not benefit from such policies; they
are harmed.
Other concepts loosely thrown around in these cases are of a
similar nature, such as "establishing a level playing field" or
"maximizing access." Irwin Steltzer alluded to the problems of
denying access and ensuring diverse options.IS To my mind,
11. See Pitofsky, supra note 2.
12. See id. at 139.
13. See Stelzer, supra note 1.
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those concepts are basically misapplied in the context of a
language. That is, it would not make sense in order to level the
playing field or to maximize access as between English and
Spanish to mandate that members of the English language
network use Spanish verbs. Similarly, it makes no sense to
require, when we boot up a thought, that both the English and
the Spanish equivalent appear on our intellectual first screen. As
anyone who is even partially bilingual knows, if one wants to be
truly effective in communication, one needs to think and talk in
one language at a time.
That is not to say that the antitrust laws are irrelevant in the
context of networks or of modem intellectual property more
generally. For example, if the Microsoft litigation14 results in an
order requiring Microsoft to quit threatening other firms and to
quit using belligerent language, little harm will result. For that
matter, if the court enters an order requiring Netscape's
Navigator to be added to Windows's first screen along with
Internet Explorer, equally little harm will result. 15 Of. course,
considering such an order and remedy suggests the basic
incoherence of the Microsoft prosecution. What is the
significance of the browser? Why Navigator among browsers?
Why not other applications? Where does it stop? Ifwe transform
Judge Jackson for the computer software industry into a Judge
Harold Green who thwarted developments in telephony for over
a decade, then there will be serious harm to consumers and to
the world.
There is no question with regard to information industries
that we are in a new age, and it is an age of endless possibilities.
We must adapt our understanding of the antitrust laws in order
to make certain that the laws advance these possibilities rather
than retard them.
14. SeeMicrosojt, 1998WL614485.
15. See Lemley & McGowen, supra note 7, at 507.
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